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The Northern Ireland Agreement:
An Explication of a Political Milestone 1
by Bernadette C. Hayes 2 and Ian McAllister 3
Zusammenfassung
Am Karfreitag, den 10. April 1998 wurde das Nordirlandabkommen von allen politischen
Parteien Nordirlands unterzeichnet. Sowohl von den politischen Kommentatoren und poli-
tischen Beobachtern wurde das Hauptziel des Abkommens, das Unvereinbare zu vereinba-
ren, als eine bedeutende Errungenschaft angesehen, nämlich die beiden religiösen Ge-
meinschaften in Nordirland, die Protestanten und Katholiken, die Unionisten und Natio-
nalisten, die Loyalisten und die Republikaner in einem gerechten und dauerhaften Abkom-
men, das die unterschiedlichen Traditionen respektiert, zusammenzubringen. In welchem
Ausmaß wurde dieses Ziel erreicht? Um eine Antwort auf diese Frage zu finden und ein
Verständnis davon zu vermitteln, wie das Abkommen versucht, einen akzeptablen politi-
schen Kompromiß für beide religiösen Gruppen zu finden, richtet sich dieser Artikel auf
die folgenden drei Streitfragen: Zunächst werden Hintergrundinformationen im Sinne von
aktuellen sozialen und politischen Beziehungen zwischen den beiden religiösen Traditio-
nen präsentiert. Es folgt ein kurzer historischer Überblick über die Intensität und das
Ausmaß des Konfliktes, wie auch sein Einfluß auf die laufenden demokratischen Entschei-
dungen in dieser Provinz. Schließlich werden die eigentlichen Bedingungen des Abkom-
mens, seine öffentliche Akzeptierbarkeit unter den beiden religiösen Gruppen ebenso wie
die Chancen für einen friedlichen und andauernden Ausgleich in Nordirland geprüft.
                                                
1 This article is based on a revised version of a paper presented by Bernadette C. Hayes at a seminar of the
Central Archive for Empirical Social Research, University of Cologne, where she was a visiting researcher
from March-May 1998. The research fellowship was funded by the Training and Mobility of Researchers
(TMR) programme - Large Scale Facility Activity (LSF) of the European Union.
2 Bernadette C. Hayes, Department of Sociology, Queen’s University of Belfast, Belfast BT7 1NN, Northern
Ireland.




On Good Friday, the 10th April 1998, the Northern Ireland Agreement was formally en-
dorsed by all the major political parties in Northern Ireland. Considered a landmark
achievement by both political analysts and commentators alike, the primary purpose of the
agreement was to reconcile the irreconcilable; to bring together the two religious commu-
nities of Northern Ireland, Protestant and Catholic, Unionist and Nationalist, Loyalist and
Republican, in an equitable and lasting accommodation that would respect their differing
traditions and heritage. To what extent was this objective met? To answer this question
and to provide an understanding of how the agreement sought to find a political compro-
mise acceptable to both religious communities, this article addresses the agreement in
terms of the following three issues. First, some background information in terms of the
current social and political relations between the two religious traditions in Northern Ire-
land is presented. This is followed by a brief historical overview of the scale and intensity
of the conflict as well as its impact for current democratic governance within the province.
Finally, the actual terms of the agreement, its public acceptability among the two religious
communities, as well as its chances of achieving a peaceful and lasting settlement within
Northern Ireland are examined.
Introduction
After much political drama and extensive media hype, on Good Friday, the 10th April
1998, the Northern Ireland Agreement was formally endorsed by all the major political
parties in Northern Ireland. For the first time in Northern Ireland`s long and troubled his-
tory, political representatives from both communities - Protestant and Catholic, Unionist
and Nationalist, Loyalist and Republican -  came together to achieve what must be consid-
ered, by any standards, the completion of one of the most difficult but eventually success-
ful negotiations undertaken in this society. United in a common purpose to end the vio-
lence and to find a political compromise acceptable to both religious communities, the
primary aim of the participants to the agreement was to reconcile the irreconcilable. Above
all else, the agreement was a finely-tuned endeavour aimed at satisfying both the differing
traditions and aspirations of the two religious communities within Northern Ireland and in
doing so, hopefully, to pave the way for democratic governance.
The achievement of this attempted balance was not without controversy, however. No
sooner had the agreement been endorsed but an avalanche of criticism was hurled at the
participants from all sides. While some political commentators from both sides of the two
religious traditions castigated it as a negation of their national traditions and heritage,
other, more muted, criticisms stressed the one-sided nature of the agreement in terms of
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either a unionist or nationalist advantage. Still other, more vocal commentators, lambasted
the agreement as a death knell for democracy and characterised it as nothing more than a
sell-out to terrorists, more notably the paramilitary organisations, such as the Irish Repub-
lican Army (IRA), on the Catholic or nationalist side. To what extent are these differing
interpretations correct? For example, was the Northern Ireland Agreement, in fact, a sell-
out to republican terrorists as some Unionist commentators, most notably Ian Paisley, have
suggested? Alternatively, to what extent do claims concerning the one-sided nature of the
agreement, either in terms of its perceived greater accommodation to either unionist or
nationalist aspirations, hold up?
To answer these questions and to provide an understanding of how this agreement sought
to achieve a balanced compromise in terms of the differing traditions and aspirations of the
two religious communities within Northern Ireland, this article will address the agreement
in terms of the following three issues. First, background information in terms of the current
social and political relations between the two religious traditions in Northern Ireland is
presented. Second, this will be followed by a brief overview of the scale and intensity of
the conflict as well as its impact on democratic governance within the province. Finally,
the actual terms of the agreement, both in terms of its particular details, its perceived
advantages and disadvantages for each of the two religious communities, as well as its
chances of achieving a peaceful and lasting political settlement within Northern Ireland is
addressed.
Religion, Community Relations and Political Identity
The Northern Irish conflict has traditionally been characterised as a sectarian conflict be-
tween two monolithic religious communities, Protestant and Catholic. Although this view
has been disputed over the past quarter of century, mainly by Marxists, few social scien-
tists question the basic proposition that the major divide, or the principal source of identity
in Northern Ireland, is religious affiliation (see Whyte, 1990, for a review of this literature).
Empirical research confirms this proposition (see Table 1). In every census conducted up
to 1981, more than nine out of ten residents of Northern Ireland identified either with the
Catholic Church or one of the Protestant denominations. In the 1951 census alone, 99.4 per
cent of the population fell into these two categories. Although this figure had fallen by
1991, or the most recent census, approximately 85 per cent of the total population still ex-
plicitly claim either a Catholic or Protestant religious affiliation. Furthermore, the propor-
tion of individuals who claim a Catholic religious affiliation has grown significantly over
the last two decades. Currently, 38.4 per cent of the Northern Ireland population identify
themselves as Roman Catholic as compared to 45.6 per cent for their Protestant counter-
parts.
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Table 1: Religious Identification in Northern Ireland, 1961-1991
Year of Census
Religious affiliation 1961 1971 1981 1991
Protestant 60.4 55.6 48.4 45.6
Catholic 34.9 31.4 28.0 38.4
Other 2.7 3.6 5.1 5.0
Not Stated 2.0 9.4 18.5 7.3
No religion --- --- --- 3.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(N) (1,425,042) (1,519,640) (1,481,959) (1,577,836)
Note: In the 1991 census, a separate category was introduced which allowed individuals to explicitly identify
themselves as having no religious affiliation, or the people whom sociologists of religion have traditionally
referred to as “Nones”.
Source: Northern Ireland Census, 1961, 1971, 1981 and 1991.
More importantly, however, these religious divisions are not merely nominal but extend to
all areas of political and social life within the province. Northern Ireland is an extremely
religiously segregated society (see Curtice and Gallagher, 1990). The two communities
are educated separately, are segregated both residentially and in their places of work, and
display very low rates of intermarriage. For example, recent estimates from the Social
Identity in Northern Ireland Survey undertaken by Karen Trew at Queen’s University of
Belfast suggests that only about one in six of the adult population has attended a school
where there are pupils of the other religion, a proportion that has remained constant over
the past thirty years or so, and that the vast majority claim that all of most of their relatives
and neighbours, 85 and 66 per cent respectively, are of the same religion as themselves.
Added to this separation are inequalities in life chances. Protestants are, on average, better
educated and more affluent than Catholics and are substantially less likely to be unem-
ployed, despite the passage of a series of anti-discrimination laws since the late 1970s
(Smith and Chambers, 1991).
However, more so than any other factor, it is disagreement about political identity and the
preferred constitutional position of Northern Ireland that separates the two communities.
Here preferences are polarised around two competing ideologies: Unionism - support for
the retention of the union between Northern Ireland and Great Britain - and, Nationalism -
support for a united Ireland. It is these deeply felt and mutually exclusive ideologies that
have given Northern Irish politics its distinctive and violent nature. The conflict is further
heightened in that this political cleavage coincides to a considerable extent with a religious
division (see Table 2). In other words, not only do the vast majority of Protestants (75 per
cent) perceive themselves as Unionists, but they are also overwhelming in their support for
the maintenance of the Union with Britain (88 per cent).
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Remain part of UK 88 34
Reunify Ireland 6 56
Other Option 2 3
Don’t know 4 6
Not answered 0 1
(N) (354) (290)
Source: Northern Ireland Social Attitudes Survey, 1995.
This uniformity in political identities and constitutional preferences is not as stark within
the Catholic community. Nevertheless, Table 2 shows that just over half of all Catholics
(51 per cent) see themselves as Nationalists, and a majority (56 per cent) favours a united
Ireland. More importantly, however, whereas no Catholic sees him or herself in terms of a
Unionist identity, the reverse is true in terms of a Nationalist identity for Protestants. Fur-
thermore, a review of past survey evidence suggests that in contrast to the stability in Prot-
estant views which have never deviated more than three percentage points since the late
1980s, the amount of Catholics who wish to remain within the United Kingdom has fluctu-
ated considerably in the last few years decreasing from 36 per cent in 1993 to just 24 per
cent in 1994, only to rise again to 34 per cent in 1995 (Breen, 1996).
This sectarian division is further reflected in the political party structure (see Table 3). For
example, not only do the overwhelmingly majority of Protestants support the two main
Unionist Parties (the Democratic Unionist Party [DUP] led by Ian Paisley and the Ulster
Unionist Party [UUP] led by David Trimble) but Catholics almost exclusively divide their
support between the two main nationalist parties (the Social Democratic Labour Party
[SDLP] led by John Hume and Sinn Fein [SF] led by Gerry Adams). Furthermore,
whereas no Catholic supports either of the two main unionist parties (DUP and UUP) only
1 per cent of Protestants support Nationalist parties, in this case the more moderate SDLP.
Also, although both Protestants and Catholics support the one avowedly non-sectarian
party, the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland [APNI] led by John Alderdice, in both cases
the level of support it attracts is extremely modest, and it has constantly failed to capture
enough votes to win a parliamentary seat at Westminster.
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Table 3: Religious Differences in Party Preferences, 1995
(Percentages)
Protestant Catholic
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 19 0
Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) 53 0
Alliance Party Northern Ireland (APNI) 11 9
Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP) 1 60
Sinn Fein (SF) 0 7
No Party 16 24
(N) (658) (507)
Note: The parties are arranged in descending order from the most extreme Unionist parties (DUP) to the most
extreme Nationalist parties (SF).
Source: Northern Ireland Social Attitudes Survey, 1995.
In summary, then, Northern Ireland is a deeply divided society. Not only are the two re-
ligious communities segregated both geographically and socially, but for the overwhelm-
ing majority of the population their political identities and their religious affiliation are
almost coterminous. The society is also divided on a range of social factors, all of which
reinforce the sectarian divide. As we noted above, there is little or no integration between
the communities in education, with the exception of university education; intermarriage is
rare and when it occurs, the couple often choose to live outside Northern Ireland; and there
is a strong pattern of residential segregation, particularly in the working class areas of Bel-
fast and the other major towns. The net effect is a religion division which is reinforced by
divisions within the society as a whole, which are recreated from generation to generation.
Exposure to Political Violence
Accompanying these high levels of religious segregation and political division, Northern
Ireland has also experienced a long and sustained period of political violence. By any stan-
dards, the exposure of Northern Ireland society to political violence has been massive. For
example, since the start of the current Troubles in 1967, there has been: 3,172 deaths (70
per cent of which have been civilian); 24,024 civilian injuries; 35,059 shooting incidents;
14,884 bomb explosions; and 16,365 individuals charged with terrorist offences (see
Table 4).
In a population of just over 1.5 million people, the scale and the intensity of the violence
put it on the level of a war. If we were to extrapolate the scale of the violence to Britain,
with a population of over 57 million, we would find somewhere in the region of 119,000
deaths, one million civilian injuries and 1,315,000 shooting instances. In the United States,
the same level of violence would result in just over half a million deaths and close to four
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Deaths 3,172 119,000 515,000
Civilian injuries 24,024 1,000,000 3,904,000
Shooting incidents 35,059 1,315,000 5,697,000
Bomb explosions 14,884 558,000 2,419,000
Persons charged with terrorist offences 16,365 614,000 2,659,000
Source: Bairner, 1996, pp. 168-171.
million injuries. By any standards, whether in terms of the general loss of life or the extent
of civilian casualties, both the level and intensity of the communal violence in Northern
Ireland must be considered more like a war than a minor conflict.
It is hardly surprising, then, that substantial numbers of people in Northern Ireland have
had significant exposure to various aspects of the violence (see Table 5). The most recently
available survey evidence shows that whereas 16 per cent of Protestants and 26 per cent of
Catholics claim that they have been caught up in a riot, almost double these numbers - 28
per cent of Protestants and 48 per cent of Catholics - have had some direct exposure to
violence. When indirect exposure to the violence is considered, the numbers climb even
further, with about two-thirds of individuals within both communities been affected in
terms of claiming knowledge of the death or injury of someone they know.
Table 5: Exposure to Political Violence in Northern Ireland, 1995
(Percentages)
Protestant Catholic
Caught up in Riot 16 26
Direct Exposure
   Intimidated 13 29
   House searched 3 24
   Family member killed or injured 17 22
   Victim, uninjured 5 6
   Victim, injured 4 6
     [At least one] [28] [48]
Indirect Exposure
   Know someone killed 60 63
   Know someone injured 56 57
     [At least one] [68] [69]
(N) (576) (366)
Source: Social Identity in Northern Ireland Survey, 1995
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There are also some notable differences between the two religious communities in their
exposure to different types and intensities of political violence. For example, not only do a
significantly higher proportion of Catholics than Protestants claim to have experienced the
violence first-hand in terms of their exposure to rioting behaviour, but an even more pro-
nounced differential emerges when a range of other direct violent measures such as self-
reported intimidation and house searches are considered. This is not the case when either
injury or the loss of life is considered; here, both communities have borne an equal share of
the ultimate human cost in terms of Northern Ireland’s long and violent history.
The Absence of Democratic Governance
Northern Ireland has never been a competitive democracy in the conventional sense. From
the partition of Ireland in 1920 until the suspension of the Stormont parliament in 1972,
formal democratic institutions were maintained in terms of a devolved parliament. But the
province was not a competitive democracy in the conventional sense, since there was no
possibility that the Protestant and unionist majority would ever lose an election, nor that
the Catholic and nationalist opposition could ever win. It was a hegemonic state in which
one community (Protestant) enjoyed permanent government, while the other community
(Catholic) was consigned to permanent political opposition (O’Leary and Arthur, 1990).
Since the introduction of direct rule from Britain in 1972, even limited local democracy
has been withdrawn, with the partial (and extremely short-lived) exceptions of the 1973
Assembly and the 1982 Assembly, both of which failed in their goal of re-establishing
devolution because of Protestant opposition to power-sharing with their Catholic counter-
parts. This has had the effect of creating what has been called a democratic deficit, since
Northern Ireland affairs are rarely debated at the Westminster parliament in London, and
since local government (following its reform in 1973) has few substantive powers. The
consequence has been to stifle political debate in Northern Ireland, and to ensure that
talented potential political leaders must go elsewhere to follow their ambition.
The legacy of political violence and non-democratic governance is evident in terms of the
lack of public support for democratic values in Northern Ireland. The vast majority of peo-
ple in Northern Ireland have little faith in the democratic process. Recent survey evidence
demonstrates that popular support for political efficacy and trust, two of the central con-
cepts in contemporary theories of political participation and democratic politics, is ex-
tremely low within this society (Hayes and McAllister, 1996). Irrespective of whether
Protestants or Catholics are considered, not only do the vast majority of Northern Ireland
citizens express an extremely negative opinion in terms of the responsiveness of their po-
litical representatives, but a widespread feeling of alienation and a sense of powerlessness
as to how the political system works is by far the most dominant view.
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Similar results emerge when political trust, or attitudes concerning the trustworthiness of
elected politicians, civil servants and the police force, are considered, although, in this
case, significant differences also emerge between Protestants and Catholics in relation to
the issue. As a group, Protestants are notably more trusting of these political institutions
than Catholics; the average level of trust was 37 per cent among Protestants, but only 19
per cent among Catholics. While an explanation for this religious difference can be found
in terms of the consistently more negative views expressed by Catholics concerning the
trustworthiness of these political institutions, more so that any other factor, however, it is
differences in relation to their attitudes towards the police that set Protestants and Catholics
apart on this issue. In contrast to nearly two-thirds of Protestants who believe that the po-
lice would not bend the rules to secure a conviction, only just over one quarter of Catholics
share this view.
Contrary to other western established democracies, Northern Ireland has never been a truly
democratic society in the conventional meaning of the word. Decades of political instabil-
ity and intransigence, heightened by a seemingly endless stream of violence and death, has
done little to negate this political vacuum. Popular democratic values, the underpinnings of
any effective set of democratic institutions, are weak and under-developed. It was in the
context of these historically-derived circumstances of a bitterly divided and politically dis-
illusioned people that the Good Friday agreement was formally endorsed on 10 April 1998.
The Northern Ireland Agreement
The current peace process has its roots in the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement. The Anglo-
Irish Agreement established the principle that the government of the Irish Republic had a
legitimate role to play in Northern Ireland affairs (see O'Leary and McGarry, 1993). It was
agreed to by the British conservative prime minister Margaret Thatcher who had reached
the conclusion that only extensive collaboration with the government of the Irish Republic
would improve the security situation in Northern Ireland. Her assessment of the situation
followed the hunger strikes staged by IRA prisoners in 1981-82, during which 10 died, and
the bombing of the Grand Hotel in Brighton in 1984, which narrowly missed killing her
and other cabinet members. The Anglo-Irish Agreement was opposed by both the Ulster
unionists and Irish republicans and it had no direct consequences for establishing demo-
cratic institutions in Northern Ireland.
During the 1980s the IRA had also begun to reassess its position (see McIntyre, 1995).
Irish republicans had always maintained that the key to a resolution of the Northern Ireland
problem was Britain’s continuing presence in Ireland; if Britain indicated its intention to
leave Northern Ireland, republicans argued that the Protestant majority would seek com-
mon cause with their Catholic neighbours and realise their true Irish heritage and identity.
By the late 1980s, two factors had made this position untenable. First, despite discussion of
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military and political withdrawal in the mid-1970s, the British government had taken the
decision that withdrawal would create more instability and violence than continuing their
presence in the province. Britain would therefore remain and try to maintain ‘an acceptable
level of violence’. Second, the military efforts of the IRA had failed to secure a British
withdrawal, and were unlikely to do so in the future. A new republican strategy to achieve
Irish unity was therefore imperative.
This new IRA strategy emerged as ‘the ballot box in one hand and the armalite in the
other’, the latter a reference to a rifle favoured by the IRA. Following the IRA hunger
strikes and consequent Sinn Fein electoral successes of the early 1980s, the possibility that
the IRA/Sinn Fein might replace the SDLP as the electoral representative of the Catholic
community appeared feasible for the first time. Such a strategy had the potential to achieve
Irish unity by constitutional methods, rather than by extra-constitutional physical force.
Several new factors fostered this strategy. First, there had been a generational turnover
within the IRA/Sinn Fein leadership; younger, more flexible leaders such as Gerry Adams
and Martin McGuinness replaced the republican activists of the 1960s and 1970s who saw
political change exclusively in terms of physical force. Second, John Hume, the leader of
the SDLP, had entered into a dialogue with Gerry Adams and kept the British government
informed of their progress. While Hume remained a trenchant critic of violence and en-
countered considerable opposition within his own party for talking to Adams, he remained
in regular contact with him throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s.
All of these events culminated in the Downing Street Declaration of 15 December 1993,
when the British and Irish governments agreed on a set of principles which would guide
their future approach to the Ulster problem. The key part of the declaration was the recog-
nition that Britain had no vested interest in Northern Ireland, and that it was for the people
of Ireland themselves to exercise their right of self-determination. But Ulster unionist and
British government demands for decommissioning of arms as a prior step before the start
of formal talks initially stalled the peace process. The talks eventually commenced in Janu-
ary 1996, under auspices of a former member of the US Senate, George Mitchell, but it
was not until the election of the Blair Labour government in May 1997, which deliberately
blurred the decommissioning issue, that progress began to be made. The talks finally con-
cluded with an agreement on 10 April 1998.
The April 1998 Peace Agreement is based on the principle of parity of esteem: that is, the
recognition of the political rights of both Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, and
the right to express those rights in political institutions. This principle formed much of the
basis of agreement in the Hume-Adams talks. The Agreement has three strands. Strand one
involves the creation of an elected assembly in Northern Ireland with a powersharing ex-
ecutive; decisions of the assembly require a majority of both unionists and nationalist be-
fore they can be passed. The second strand creates a North-South ministerial council to
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bring together ministers from the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland. Strand three creates
a British-Irish Council bringing together representatives from all parts of the United King-
dom, including Scotland, Wales, and England, as well as both parts of Ireland. Other parts
of the agreement stipulate total decommissioning of weapons within two years of the refer-
endums, the release of paramilitary prisoners, and an inquiry into policing in Northern Ireland.
A crucial part of the Agreement was ratification by the citizens of both parts of Ireland.
The two referendums to seek public endorsement for the Peace Agreement were held on 22
May 1998 (Table 6). There was little doubt that the Agreement would win overwhelming
support in the Irish Republic and among Ulster Catholics, but the reaction of Ulster Prot-
estants was much more uncertain. The largest party, the Ulster Unionist Party, was split on
the issue, with its new leader, David Trimble, supporting the Agreement but encountering
trenchant opposition from many of his senior colleagues. The second largest Protestant
party, the Democratic Unionists led by Ian Paisley, opposed the Agreement on the grounds
that it would undermine the Protestant community’s position within the United Kingdom.
Just one week prior to the referendum in Northern Ireland, opinion polls were showing that
the Protestant community was deeply split on the issue, with a large number of undecided
voters.
Table 6: The Result of the Referendums, 22 May 1998
Northern Ireland Irish Republic
N Percent N Percent
Yes 676,966 71.1 1,442,583 94.4
No 274,879 28.9 85,748 5.6
Total valid votes 951,845 100.0 1,528,331 100.0
Spoiled votes 1,738 17,064
(Turnout) (81.1) (56.3)
Note: In Northern Ireland, the question was: ‘Do you support the agreement reached in the multi-party talks
on Northern Ireland and set out in Command Paper 3883?; in the Irish Republic: ‘Do you approve of the
proposal to amend the Constitution contained in the undermentioned Bill, the Nineteenth Amendment of the
Constitution Bill, 1998?’ Source: http://www.irish-times.com/irish-times/special/peace
In the event, as Table 6 shows, around seven out of every 10 voters supported the Agree-
ment, compared to 94 percent of voters in the Irish Republic. The turnout in Northern Ire-
land was a very substantial 81 percent, compared to 68 percent in the 1997 Westminster
election and 65 percent in the 1996 Forum elections. However, turnout in the Irish Repub-
lic was just 56 percent, low by the standards of other referendums and partly a conse-
quence of the referendum being held alongside a referendum on the European Union’s
Amsterdam agreement, about which the major parties disagreed. The lack of agreement
between the parties on the Amsterdam agreement clearly depressed the turnout. Spoiled
votes - a traditional mechanism for demonstrating protest - were insignificant in Northern
Ireland, but amounted to 1.1 percent of all votes cast in the Irish Republic, and reflect a
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republican protest against the south’s abandonment of its historical territorial claim over
Northern Ireland, one of the key principles of the Agreement.
The split within the Protestant community on the Agreement is clearly demonstrated by the
results of an exit poll conducted on polling day in Northern Ireland (Table 7). While al-
most all of the Catholic respondents voted ‘yes’ to the Agreement, Protestants voting in
favour exceeded those voting ‘no’ by just 2 percent. In terms of voting intention, three
quarters of Ulster Unionists voted in favour of the Agreement, compared to just 11 percent
of Democratic Unionists. The narrow Protestant majority in favour of the Agreement and
the size of the group opposed to it is a major concern. This fundamental division within the
Protestant community and the size of the anti-Agreement group does not bode well for the
future of the Agreement.
Table 7: Referendum Vote, Voting Intention and Religion
Yes No (N)
All 73 27 (1,677)
Voting intention
   Ulster Unionist Party 75 25 (311)
   Democratic Unionist Party 11 89 (207)
   Alliance Party 96 4 (137)
   SDLP 99 1 (447)
   Sinn Fein 98 2 (105)
Religion
   Protestant 51 49 (798)
   Catholic 99 1 (715)
Source: Irish Times/Radio Televis Eireann Exit Poll, Friday 22nd May 1998.
With the Agreement ratified by the two electorates, the next stage was to elect an assem-
bly, from which an executive would be drawn representing both communities. These elec-
tions were held on 25 June 1998 using the single transferable vote method of proportional
representation, based on the 18 parliamentary constituencies used for elections to the
Westminster parliament. The party with the largest number of first preference votes was
the SDLP, but after transfers, the Ulster Unionist Party emerged with the largest number of
seats, 28 of the 108 seats, compared to 24 for the SDLP (see Table 8). Sinn Fein attracted
17.7 percent of the vote and won 18 seats, their largest vote to date. In practice, the SDLP
now attracts about 55 percent of the Catholic nationalist vote, Sinn Fein 45 percent. The
Assembly elections confirm that Northern Ireland is now a four party system, with two
Protestant and two Catholic parties attracting eight out of every 10 votes, and occupying 90
of the 108 seats in the Assembly. In each community, the larger of the two parties is the
more moderate.
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Table 8: The Result of the Assembly Elections, 25 June 1998
Votes
N Percent Seats
SDLP 177,963 22.0 24
Ulster Unionist Party 172,225 21.3 28
Democratic Unionist Party 145,917 18.0 20
Sinn Fein 142,858 17.7 18
Alliance 52,636 6.5 6
UK Unionist Party 36,541 4.5 5
Progressive Unionist Party 20,634 2.5 2
Women’s Coalition 13,019 1.6 2
Ulster Democratic Party 8,651 1.1 0
Labour 2,729 0.3 0
Others 36,090 4.5 3
Total valid votes 809,263 100.0 108
(Turnout 70.5)
Note: Votes are first preference votes. The allocation of seats is based on transfers between the parties using
the single transferable vote method of proportional representation, based on 18 constituencies.
Source: http://explorers.whyte.com
Conclusion
Few societies have such deep and abiding divisions as Northern Ireland. What makes
Northern Ireland unique is the range of social divisions, and the way in which they rein-
force one another and shape political identity. The educational system, patterns of resi-
dence, social networks, marriage and much of the labour force remain segregated by re-
ligion. Major social groups, which in any society provide the substance of civil society, are
also largely segregated on religious grounds. It is hardly surprising that efforts to resolve
the Northern Ireland conflict have fallen on the rock of these reinforcing, fundamental so-
cietal divisions. To be sure, other societies possess a range of social divisions which rein-
force political identity. But few, if any, have the range of reinforcing social divisions that
Northern Ireland possesses, and most have a series of competing groups, none of which
constitutes a majority. The majoritarian position of the Protestant community has been a
fundamental block to political compromise with the Catholic minority.
The 1998 Northern Ireland Agreement, the Referendums and Assembly elections, may
collectively represent an advance for Northern Ireland. On the positive side, the paramili-
tary organisations have been involved in the Agreement for the first time, a fundamental
deficiency of previous attempts to resolve the conflict. Moreover, there is substantial evi-
dence that the IRA and their Protestant counterparts have reassessed their military situation
and may be prepared to use political methods to try and attain their goals. The Agreement
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also represents the positive efforts of many other bodies to try and resolve the conflict,
most notably the British and Irish governments, and the Clinton administration in the
United States, all of whom have put pressure on the various groups they are close to in
Northern Ireland.
The major problems with the Agreement are twofold. First, it is necessarily an elite ac-
commodation, a consociational agreement common in many European countries. So far as
elites retain the confidence of their supporters, elite agreements remain an effective means
of resolving political conflict. However, the history of the Protestant community is that
political elites who are prepared to compromise on fundamental constitutional issues loose
the consensual support of their community. The deep division among Protestants over the
referendum is evidence of the potential that exists for moderate Protestant leaders to loose
their support. The second problem is that the Agreement does not deal with the basic
problems that feed the conflict: the social divisions that reinforce sectarianism and the am-
biguity towards the use of physical force for political ends. The new political arrangements
will only be able to create genuine cross-community institutions if they exist long enough
to establish the confidence of both communities. Many hope that it will achieve that goal,
but the weight of history points in the other direction.
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